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From the Theory of The Firm to FDI and Internalisation: A Survey 
 
Summary 
This paper surveys recent contributions on the Internalisation issue, based on different 
theories of the firm, to show how the make-or-buy decision, at an international level, 
has been assessed through the opening up of the “black box” - traditionally explored by 
the theorists of the firm – and the simultaneous endogenization of the market 
environment – as in the International Economics tradition. In particular, we consider 
three Archetypes – Grossman-Hart-Moore treatment of hold-up and contractual 
incompleteness, Holmstrom-Milgrom view of the firm as an incentive system, Aghion-
Tirole conceptualisation of formal and real authority in organisations – and show how 
they have been embedded in industry and general equilibrium models of FDI to explain 
the boundaries of global firms. 
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Recent years have witnessed important changes both in the world economy 
and in the nature of the firm. 
Trade economists agree on the fact that a new feature of globalisation is the 
dramatic increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade in 
intermediate goods which, in turn, reflects the new way firms organize their 
activities. 
As Abraham and Taylor (1996), Campa and Golberg (1997), Yeats (2001) 
have documented, firms in many countries are sub-contracting abroad an 
increasing range of activities – from product design and intermediate good 
production, to assembly, marketing and after sales services – meanwhile, the 
same and other firms have been engaging in FDI, so that already in the 
1990s, more than 40 percent of US imports of goods took place within the 
boundaries of multinational firms (Zeile 1997), and roughly one third of 
world trade now occurs intra-firm (Antras 2003). 
One of the most important changes involves the increasing 
interconnectedness of production processes in a vertical trading chain that 
stretches across many countries, with each country specializing in a 
particular stage of production, rather than manufacturing final goods from 
start to finish. 
“Outsourcing”, “slicing up the value chain”, “disintegration of production” 
are just a few labels for the same phenomenon of  vertical specialisation that 
pushes modern corporations towards a g lobal structure (Hummels et al. 
2001; Feenstra 1998; Feenstra and Hanson 1996). 
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Meanwhile, the enterprise itself has become the theatre of a massive 
reorganization, whose keywords sound like downsizing, decentralisation and 
empowerment of workers, resulting in flatter hierarchies and new balances 
inside the firm (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001); while traditional 
conglomerates were shaped by ownership of physical assets, modern 
organisations increasingly recognize the importance of human capital and 
talent, as the new stakeholders of the firm (Rajan and Zingales 2000). 
What accounts for these changes in the world economy, on the one hand, and 
in the nature of the enterprise, on the other?  
Vertical specialisation takes two primary forms since international 
operations may be organized either “internally”  – in wholly owned 
subsidiaries  – or “externally”  – under arm’s length contracts with 
independent local producers: what we call Internalisation pertains the choice 
between Integration and Outsourcing. 
In the last 20 years, the literature on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) has 
basically developed around Dunning’s OLI framework, which groups the 
motives to undertake foreign direct investment in three categories: 
Ownership, Location and Internalisation advantages (Dunning 1993). 
The underlying intuition is quite simple: if MNEs were exactly identical to 
domestic firms, they would not find it profitable to enter the domestic 
market, due to the high cost of doing business abroad; since FDIs indeed 
exist, it must be the case that multinational firms possess some inherent 
advantages easily exploitable through direct investment. 
Ownership advantages correspond to some product, know-how, reputation or 
production process to which other firms do not have access: these are called 
“knowledge-based, firm-specific assets”, they are easily transferred across 
countries and not-excludable, to a large extent. Location advantages arise 
when it is profitable to produce directly in the domestic market, rather than 
producing at home and exporting abroad, due to tariffs, transportation costs, 
cheap factor prices etc. Internalisation advantages represent the most abstract 
concept within the OLI framework and generically refer to corporate 
governance issues, such as the boundaries of the firm. 
In a way, we could say that the first two points explain why firms should go 
multinational, while the third one refers to the entry mode, namely the form 
of involvement in a foreign country. 
The literature on MNEs has first combined Ownership and Location 
considerations while keeping aside the Internalisation issue
1. 
The early modelling  - due to Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984) and 
lately extended by Helpman (1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985), 
Horstmann and Markusen (1987a) - has found more recent application in  
Brainard (1993), Horstmann and Markusen (1992). 
These models share three common features  – namely plant-level scale 
economies, firm-level activity as joint inputs across plants and the presence 
of tariffs or transportation costs between the foreign and the local firm – and 
derive a simple conclusion, according to which multinationals are supported 
in equilibrium when firm-level fixed costs and transportation costs are large, 
relative to plant-level scale economies; moreover, MNEs are more likely to 
exist the larger, and the more similar the countries (Brainard 1993). 
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Simulations with countries differing in size, relative factor endowment and 
technology are shown in Markusen and Venables (1996), leading to the 
famous “convergence hypothesis”, according to which as countries become 
more similar, international economic activity is increasingly dominated by 
MNEs, which displace trade – provided that transportation costs are not very 
small. 
As far as the Internalisation issue is concerned, following Dunning’s 
intuition, the make-or-buy decision of a multinational is usually explained in 
terms of costs and benefits of using the market. Internalising typically brings 
direct cost penalties, because a local supplier would have better knowledge, 
expertise and cost advantage, with respect to an integrated firm; however, 
relying on the market may be highly risky due to technology transfer (see, 
among others: Teece 1977, 1986, Rugman 1986), informational asymmetries 
(Ethier 1986), moral hazard and defection by the local firm (Rugman 1985, 
1986, Horstmann and Markusen 1996), agent opportunism and reputation 
concerns (Horstmann and Markusen 1987b). 
To summarize, the original literature on FDI and Internalisation identified in 
the dissipation of firms’ intangible assets the main motive for Integration. 
Firms’ intangible assets basically belong to two different categories, namely 
superior knowledge  - associated with production process, design of new 
products, technology, management techniques etc. - and stock of goodwill - 
associated with the reputation for product quality. 
In the first case, the optimal organisational  structure depends on the degree 
of transferability of knowledge capital (see Ethier and Markusen 1996, and 
later refinements due to Markusen 2001, Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde 2001, 
Glass and Saggi 2002). Once knowledge has been transferred, the licensee
2 
might terminate the deal with the multinational and set up its own product 
unit. However, designing a contract in such a way as to prevent the agent’s 
defection may be costly for the MNE, since some rents must be shared with 
the licensee to make defection unprofitable. The multinational might then 
prefer to operate with a wholly owned subsidiary.  
When knowledge is very easy or very hard
3 to transfer, Integration tends to 
dominate, while for intermediate levels of knowledge transfer, the MNE 
decides by trading off the costs and benefits of Integration and Outsourcing. 
In line with the empirical evidence (Mansfield and Romeo 1980, Mansfield, 
Romeo and Wagner 1980, Smith 2001), Internalisation is more likely to 
emerge in firms whose know-how is subject to spillovers, firms that are able 
to borrow on the capital market at lower costs, and firms dealing with a local 
counterpart who is fast at learning and moves in a l egal  environment in 
which property rights are not adequately protected. 
When knowledge comes, instead, in the form of goodwill, and quality is not 
observable to consumers before purchase, a free-riding problem is likely to 
emerge, as the licensee does not have the same incentive as the MNE to 
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preserve and enhance reputation, although he benefits from it (Horstmann 
and Markusen 1987b). Any licensing contract that tries to transfer all the 
surplus from the licensee to the multinational would be unfeasible: by 
skimping on quality, the licensee obtains a positive gain. To avoid free-
riding, the multinational firm is thus obliged to transfer some rents to the 
licensee. In this setting, Integration may help by providing better monitoring 
over the local subsidiary. 
This paper surveys more recent contributions on the Internalisation issue, 
based on different theories of the firm, to show how the make-or-buy 
decision, at an international level, has been assessed through the opening up 
of the “black box” - traditionally explored by the theorists of the firm – and 
the simultaneous endogenization of the market environment – as in the 
International Economics tradition. 
In our view, this represents an interesting and innovative perspective, with 
respect to the previous literature, in that the firm – originally taken as given 
– becomes the centre of the analysis, and its internal hierarchy is carefully 
explored, and related to the market dynamics. 
In particular, we consider three Archetypes – 1) Grossman-Hart-Moore (G-
H-M) treatment of hold-up and contractual incompleteness; 2) Holmstrom-
Milgrom (H-M) view of the firm as an incentive system; 3) Aghion-Tirole 
(A-T) conceptualisation of formal and real authority in organisations – and 
show how they have been embedded in industry and general equilibrium 
models to explain the boundaries of global firms. 
Within each of the three approaches, we first describe the original archetype, 
in order to provide the reader with the underlying intuition, the key words 
and the specific terminology; then we consider the application to a context of 
FDI. 
While this is our roadmap, across the burgeoning literature on 
Internalisation, in presenting the papers within each field, we do not 
necessarily follow a chronological order, rather we consider each 
contribution as a further step towards a comprehensive characterisation of 
firms’ organisational solutions, moving from the simple domestic ownership 
decision to a more complete formalisation of location and ownership 
concerns in a unitary framework. 
With a few exceptions (Antras 2003; Feenstra and Hanson 2003, 2004), this 
survey covers only theoretical aspects since, as far as we know, empirical 
tests have not been performed yet. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the main 
approach, based on  transaction costs, contractual incompleteness and the 
property right theory of the firm; a simple model is designed, in the spirit of 
Grossman-Hart-Moore, to capture the hold up mechanism that has been 
employed in models of FDI. Section 3 groups together alternative theories of 
the firm  – namely Holmstrom-Milgrom and Aghion-Tirole  – which are 
briefly described, and comments their applications to the context of 
Internalisation; due to the limited number of contributions, within these 
fields, we decided to keep the discussion intuitive without adding 
formalisation. Section 4 concludes the analysis and suggests future lines of 
research. 
 
 2. Hold up 
In this section, we present the first Theory of the Firm-approach to FDI and 
Internalisation, based on transaction costs, hold up and contractual 
incompleteness.    5 
A simple model is designed, in the spirit of Grossman-Hart-Moore (2.1), to 
summarize the main ingredients that have been employed in industry and 
general equilibrium models to assess the boundaries of multinational 
enterprises; whenever extensions or modifications have been adopted, with 
respect to our stylised formalisation, they will be carefully discussed (2.2). 
 
2.1 Archetype 1: Transaction Costs,  Contractual Incompleteness and the 
Property Right Theory of the Firm 
What we call Archetype 1 builds on the notion of transaction costs and 
contractual incompleteness: formerly spelled by Coase (1937) and lately 
operationalised by Williamson (1985), these concepts received the first 
formal treatment in Grout (1984), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and 
Moore (1990), where a hold up mechanism was introduced and  rigorously 
modelled. 
In an ideal world, the relationship between two parties would be easily 
governed by  a complete contract, namely a contract that specifies all the 
contingencies that may affect the contractual relationship. 
Unfortunately such a contract does not exist in reality, mainly because of 
three reasons (Salaniè 1997): 
§  Unforeseen contingencies, in the sense that bounded rationality may 
force the parties to neglect some key variables whose effect on the 
relationship they find difficult to evaluate; 
§  Cost of writing contracts, in terms of time and money, since real world 
negotiation is a long and complex process which mobilizes managers 
and lawyers. It must therefore be that, at some point, the cost of taking 
into account a very unlikely contingency outweighs the benefit of 
writing a specific clause in the contract; 
§  Cost of enforcing contracts, due to the inability of a third party to verify 
ex post the values taken by certain variables and eventually settle the 
disputes that may arise. 
Real world is thus the land of incomplete contracts turn out to be vague or 
silent on a number of key features (Tirole 1999) and have gaps, missing 
provisions or ambiguities (Hart 1995): real word contracts simply provide a 
starting point for the two parties’ relationship, but they need to be completed 
ex post through renegotiation. 
Consider, for example, the economic relationship between an upstream firm, 
which we call input supplier (IS, he), and a downstream firm, which we label 
as final good producer (FP, she). 
FP has an access to a technology for converting specialized intermediate 
inputs into final goods: if the specialized inputs are of high quality, final 
good production requires no further variable cost and simply y = x, where y 
and x indicate respectively the amount of final good produced and 
intermediate input employed, while sales revenues are equal to R(x), an 
increasing and concave function (Rx>0 and Rxx<0); if the inputs are of low 
quality, they cannot be converted into final goods, so sales revenues are zero. 
FP has two options for obtaining intermediate inputs: it can either 
manufacture them within firm’s boundaries – which we call Integration - or 
buy them from an independent supplier IS – which we call Outsourcing. 
To capture the idea that the input supplier has a relative advantage in its own 
activity  – namely he is more efficient than the final good producer in 
manufacturing inputs  –  we assume that the technology to produce 
intermediate inputs requires one unit of labour to obtain one unit of high 
quality specialized component, if this task is performed by IS, while l>=1   6 
units of labour are needed when the same activity is done by FP; we further 
assume that low quality inputs can be produced at a negligible cost, and 
wage rate is equalized to 1. 
Notice that, in our basic framework, IS is the only party that makes a 
relation  specific-investment, since intermediate goods are fully tailored to a 
particular final product; in order to keep the model as simple as possible, in 
the event of disagreement over the terms of trade, we leave the two parties 
with no outside option, in the sense that none of them can deal with an 
alternative partner. 
Consider, as a benchmark, the case in which x is chosen to maximize joint 
profit: 
P = R(x) – x  
The first order conditions, with respect to x, yield the efficient amount of 
high quality input: x*= Rx
-1(1 ). 
This result can be obtained also in a complete contracts setting, by assuming 
that IS develops its components and sells them to FP at a unitary price of p. 
In this case, the profits of the two independent firms are given by: 
p
IS = (p-1) x     and     p
FP = R(x) – px  
From profit maximization, we see that Rx(x) = p and the price p is set equal 
to 1, which means that a decentralized complete contracts setting entails 
exactly the same optimal choice of x as in the benchmark case. 
Suppose, now, that it is not possible to write a contract, covering all the 
possible contingencies that may affect the economic relation between IS and 
FP. 
In these circumstances, the supplier may fear that, after manufacturing 
specialized components, the final good producer denies the due payment, 
claiming that some contingencies, uncovered by the contract, have occurred. 
The contract is thus renegotiated ex post but the bargaining position of the 
input supplier is extremely weak, because its investment in x is already sunk 
at the renegotiation stage, and components have no other use outside that 
specific relationship. Fearing to be held up by the other party, IS tends to 
under-invest, producing a quantity of input lower than x*. 
If contracts are complete, the allocation of property rights only matters for 
distributive purposes; if contracts are, instead, incomplete, who owns what is 
a crucial point, in order to take actions whenever an unforeseen contingency 
occurs. The essence of the Property Right Theory of the Firm  is that 
ownership of physical assets, by determining residual control rights, entails 
important economic implications, and affects the two parties’ incentives to 
invest, as we show below
4. 
Suppose that the input supplier’s relation-specific investments is  non 
contractible, in the sense that a price for intermediate goods cannot be set ex 
ante.  
In order to see how contractual incompleteness eventually distorts the 
benchmark result, we model a game in four steps (Fig. 1): 1) FP 
                                                 
4 This approach, based on Grossman and Hart (1986) has been criticized for focusing 
exclusively on the incentives of top executives to make relation-specific investments. Hart 
and Moore (1990) develop a property-right theory of the firm in which ownership of physical 
assets affects the incentives of workers, while a more theoretical literature has formally 
studied the foundation of incomplete contracts (see Maskin and Tirole (1999), Segal (1999), 
Hart and Moore (1999)). An interesting extension of the G-H-M framework is due to Legros 
and Newman (2000), where ownership is defined by residual control rights however, rather 
than focusing on hold up, a complete contract approach is taken to show how organisations 
are designed in a competitive economy.   7 
decides whether to  internalise input production (Integration) or to 
outsource it to an independent firm (Outsourcing); 2) production of x 
intermediate goods takes place; 3) the two parties meet and discuss 
over the terms of trade: if they agree, revenues are split according to  
Nash bargaining, where the weights are given by w˛[0,1] for the input 
supplier and (1-w) for final good producer
5; if they do not agree, since 
none of them has an outside option, they earn zero 4) production and 
sale of final goods occur.  








The model is solved by backward induction. 
Fist of all, consider stage 3: if IS and FP operate separately and they reach an 
agreement, their shares of surplus are given by:   
p
FP = (1-w) R(x)  
p
IS = w R(x)  
In stage 2, IS chooses x in order to maximize (p
IS-x). First order conditions 
are given by: 
w Rx(x) = 1 
which means that the optimal investment by the input supplier, under 
Outsourcing (O), is x
O= Rx
-1(1/w). Given that w˛[0,1] x
O<x*, the extent of 
under-investment crucially depends on the bargaining strength of IS: the 
weaker his position  – lower  w  - the l ower the amount of components 
produced. 
At stage 1, the final good producer chooses the organisational form by 
comparing  P 
FP =  (1-w) R(x
O) with the profit  P
I that it would  obtain 
operating as an integrated firm. 
Notice that, in this case, FP would keep the entire revenues R(x) but she 
would carry higher cost of producing intermediate inputs, due to her lower 
efficiency with respect to IS. 
By maximizing P
I = R(x) – lx with respect to x, we obtain: 
Rx =  l  and, thus, x
I = Rx
-1 (l)  
The optimal amount of i ntermediate goods, under Integration (I), x
I is a 
decreasing function of l: the more the cost advantage of IS with respect to 
FP, the less appealing the Integration solution; when, instead, an integrated 
firm is as efficient as a specialized input supplier, in manufacturing 
components, Integration provides a solution to under-investment in x. 
By substituting x





At stage 1, the final good producer decides to internalise input production if 
P
I>=P
O, while she outsources the same activity if P
I<P
O. 
                                                 
5 Here we stick on a basic formulation in which Nash bargaining occurs only under 
Outsourcing; notice, however, that hold up concerns have been originally modelled also 
within an integrated firm (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990) 
4)  
production and  
sales of final  
goods 
 3) 
ex post bargaining:  the 
firms meet and choose 





  1) 
Integration  
vs  
Outsourcing   8 
From the previous discussion, it should be clear that the boundaries of the 
downstream firm are shaped by a trade off between governance costs – 
captured by l - and transaction costs – related to w.  
By the  envelope theorem, d P
I/l =  -x
I<0, and d P
O/w =  - R(x
O)<0: other 
things being equal, an increase in governance costs, making an integrated 
firm more and more inefficient, pushes towards Outsourcing, while an 
increase in the bargaining position of the input supplier, resulting in a lower 
profit for FP under Outsourcing, tilts the ownership decision in favour of 
Integration. 
 
2.2 From Archetype 1 to FDI and Internalisation 
The previous discussion of what we called Archetype 1 served the purpose 
of illustrating,  in a few words, the mechanism underlying the models that 
will be presented in this Section. 
Feenstra and Hanson (2003) consider firms’  international ownership 
decision to undertake FDI versus International Outsourcing in terms of 
managerial incentives and property rights. Their paper is intended to capture 
the motivations underlying Export Processing Operations (EPO) in China
6, 
which played a major role in the 1990s, accounting for more than 50 per cent 
of total exports from China. 
Two alternative models of EPO – one based on the Grossman-Hart-Moore 
framework, the other one designed in the spirit of Holmstrom-Milgrom – are 
built, and testable predictions  - whose relevance is explored through 
econometric analysis - are derived. 
In what follows, we focus on the property right model, while postponing the 
other one to Section 3
7. 
Consider the economic relation between a multinational firm (f) and a local 
firm (g), linked by export processing operations.  
Production of final goods requires intermediate components – that can be 
purchased by either of the two firms  – and takes place within the local 
factory, under Integration or Outsourcing. 
This setting entails an important peculiarity, with respect to the simple 
model sketched in Section 2.1, and the more complete characterisations of 
the make-or-buy decision that will be discussed later in this section, and in 
Section 3. Here, in fact,  production of final goods is exclusively due to g, 
and inputs can be supplied by either of the two parties, while elsewhere 
assembly is due to the multinational, and inputs are either produced within 
firm’s boundaries or bought from an independent supplier. 
Organizational forms (d1,d2) result from the intersection of two dimensions: 
who owns the factory – captured by the parameter d2 ˛ {0,1}, with  d2 =0 
if f owns (FDI), and d2 =1 if g owns (Outsourcing) - and who controls input 
purchase – denoted by d1 ˛{0,1}, with  d1 =0 if f controls (pure-assembly 
regime), and d1 =1 if g controls (import assembly-regime).  
Notice that export processing operations require effort investments by both 
parties, in order to find cheap inputs (e1), prepare the processing factory 
(e2), and marketing final products (e3); by assumption, e3 rests with f, e2 
rests with g, while e1 lies with either of the two parties, depending on the 
assembly regime. 
                                                 
6 Under this arrangement, firms import parts and components from abroad, process these 
inputs into final goods, and then export the final products (Feenstra and Hanson 2003). 
7 Feenstra and Hanson (2004) combine both aspects in a single model, which will be 
discussed in Section 3.1.2.   9 
The timing is as follows: 1) the multinational makes the decision on who 
owns the factory and who controls input purchase; 2) effort investments e1, 
e2 and e3 are made; 3) input purchase and processing take place, and final 
goods sales follow. 
Contractual incompleteness governs the relationship between f and g, and 
the two parties divide the ex post surplus through Nash Bargaining, with 
weights w˛[0,1] for the local firm and (1-w) for the multinational. 
Notice that Feenstra and Hanson (2003) extend Archetype 1 -model by 
giving the two parties an outside option – dependant on the organisational 
form ( d1,d2)  -  in case of disagreement; in addition, asset specificity is 
relaxed, in the sense that inputs controlled by either party can be utilized at 
the same cost in another factory, but efforts are only partially transferable 
when the relationship breaks down.  
Call W d1,d2(e1,e2,e3) the total surplus of the project, depending on the 
efforts exerted by the two parties, when the organizational form (d1,d2) is 
chosen; Feenstra and Hanson (2003) show that W is submodular, namely 
W0,0 + W1,1 < W0,1 + W1,0 , therefore, in this framework, it is often optimal to 
split ownership and control between the local firm and the multinational. 
We believe that one of the main achievements of this paper lays in the 
empirical analysis, since the G -H-M literature accounts just for a few 
attempts at testing theoretical propositions with real world data (see Baker 
and Hubbard (2001), Whinston (2001) for a survey of empirical works). 
The modularity of the surplus function cannot be tested directly, because we 
do not observe the value of surplus from outsourcing activity  - while we 
observe the processing exports related to each organisational form – so the 
authors follow Whinston (2001) and move to a simple stochastic 
specification, by assuming that ownership and control are chosen to 
maximize W d1, d2 plus an i.i.d. error term, that varies across contractual 
arrangements.  
Empirical evidence, based on data from the Customs General Administration 
of the People’s Republic of China, strongly supports Feenstra and Hanson 
(2003) theoretical predictions, showing that ownership and control tend to be 
shared between a foreign firm  – that typically owns the Chinese factory  – 
and a local firm – that typically controls input purchase. 
We decided to start our review of Archetype1-based models with this paper 
because,  although very recent, it assesses the make-or-buy decision of a 
multinational firm in a very basic way, neglecting important aspects that 
have been embedded in richer models. Notice, for instance, that the 
international dimension of the analysis is completely taken as given, without 
any attempt at building an industry or general equilibrium model, nor at 
considering a multi-agent setting: what the authors do, here, is just to design 
a theory of the firm model, where the comparison between FDI and 
International Outsourcing, instead of Domestic Integration and  Domestic 
Outsourcing, simply arises from the fact that  a foreign and a local firm are 
involved, by assumption.  
In the seminal contribution by Ethier (1986), the Internalisation decision is 
instead endogenized in a general equilibrium framework of International 
Trade, where a firm’s choice of internalising certain activities is explained in 
terms of information exchange between two agents. Although not explicitly 
related to the literature on incomplete contracts and hold up, this represents  
an important predecessor in that informational and transaction concerns are   10 
clearly spelled and their implications on the contractual agreement are 
rigorously derived. 
Some decades after this early intuition, McLaren (2000) makes the first 
attempt to extend the contractual incompleteness framework  - to allow for 
multilateral relations among agents  - and embed Archetype 1 -tools in an 
industry equilibrium model where the  ownership decision of firms  – 
Integration versus Outsourcing, at a domestic level – endogenously emerges 
as an equilibrium outcome
8. 
While microeconomic models, summarized in Archetype 1, simply 
considered the link between a single producer and a single potential supplier, 
neglecting the interdependence among firms operating in the same sector, in 
McLaren (2000), all firms’ entry, contracting and pricing decisions are 
optimal, given the choices made by the others; this leads to a simple 
feedback mechanism in which a firm’s choice, by affecting the market 
conditions, influences other firms’ decision about the organizational form. 
This paper is specifically designed to assess the impact of globalisation on 
vertical integration, that is shown to be replaced by downsizing and 
outsourcing, as long as international openness increases. 
Consider an industry composed of n downstream firms (FP, using our 
previous terminology) producing final goods, and n upstream firms (IS), 
manufacturing specialized intermediate components. Each FP may use, at 
most, one input,  and each IS may produce, at most, one component; 
moreover, input suppliers may decide whether to manufacture components 
that are fully tailored to a particular final product – which is called maximal 
specialisation technology – or flexible ones – under a flexibility technology – 
that may be easily employed for alternative uses. 
Fully tailored components allow final good producers to reduce variable 
costs by 1; within the flexibility technology, an input is “effective” – with 
probability r - or “dud” – with probability (1-r): in the fist case, there is a 
cost reduction of e for the intended user, and of d for an alternative FP; in the 
second case, there is a reduction of e’ for the intended user, and of d’ for an 
alternative one, with d’<d<e’<e<1, by assumption. 
With a slight modification, with respect to Figure 1, the model is organized 
in three stages: 1) merger; 2) intermediate goods production; 3) market 
exchange. 
In the initial merger stage, each FP is given the option of making a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to an input supplier: if the offer is accepted, the two firms 
become integrated, with IS producing inputs according to the expected profit 
maximizing-technology; this solution is assumed to be characterized by high 
governance costs, as usual; if, instead, the offer is not accepted, FP and IS 
work independently and, due to contractual incompleteness, they cannot 
                                                 
8 A similar extension of the G-H-M framework to multilateral relations is due to Bolton and 
Whinston (1993), where a single upstream firm m ay interact with a multiplicity of 
downstream firms to sell its product, but the industry structure is exogenous. This setting 
yields a new complication in terms of firm’s scope: when a number of buyers rely on a single 
source of supply, shortages may make the input supplier only able to satisfy some buyers. The 
supply insurance concern thus provides a motive for vertical integration. In Kranton (1996), 
market and non market transactions are compared as alternative ways of obtaining 
intermediate goods: in the first case, FP deals with a generic supplier, in the second one, 
inputs come from a specific IS, either within firm’s boundaries or through  reciprocal 
exchange - namely an informally enforced agreement to obtain goods or services in exchange 
for future compensation in kind. In particular, personal transactions are shown to dominate 
when suppliers produce inputs specific to a buyer, and the two firms repeatedly interact.   11 
write an ex-ante contract, governing the exchange of intermediate 
components. 
In the second stage, input suppliers decides over the technology to  be 
adopted, they make a relation-specific investment and manufacture 
intermediate components: once the inputs have been produced, IS-firms 
bring them to the open market – at stage 3 – where final good producers 
place bids on components offered by different input suppliers, and 
intermediate goods are sold to the highest bidder. Notice that this timing 
allows for a potential hold up problem for the upstream firm, because its 
investment in manufacturing components is already sunk at the market stage. 
The standard trade off between governance and transaction costs, sketched in 
Section 2.1, applies also in this richer context, however an important element 
of novelty is introduced here, as a result of the new multilateral relation- 
setting: the outside option probability of an input supplier  – i.e. the 
probability of finding an alternative user for its components – increases as 
long as the number of non integrated firms, within the same sector, 
increases, adding a mechanism of interactions among firms that could not be 
captured in a simple bilateral framework. 
This market thickness principle is even reinforced in moving from closed to 
open economy, because input suppliers benefit from higher probabilities of 
selling their intermediate goods in a world where final products are 
immobile
9, but inputs can be traded across countries. 
Grossman and Helpman (2002) provide an alternative extension of the G-H-
M framework to allow for multilateral relations among agents, in an industry 
equilibrium model where the ownership decision of firms  – Integration 
versus Outsourcing, at a domestic level – is endogenized. 
The timing is extended with respect to Figure 1: a new stage of Search is 
added, as a result of the endogenization of the industry environment. Since 
the market is populated by many – not two – agents, they first need to decide 
whether to enter as vertically integrated firms, specialized input suppliers or 
specialized final good producers, then specialized firms must look for a 
partner in order to work; matches occur randomly, and those who do not find 
a partner exit the market. After specialized firms get matched, the game 
proceeds as in Section 2.1, along the steps of production of intermediate 
goods, which requires a relation-specific investment by IS
10, ex post Nash 
bargaining, production and sales of final goods. 
The trade off between Integration and Outsourcing results, at a first level, in 
the traditional comparison between governance and transaction costs: 
according to the assumptions of the model, a vertically integrated firm is less 
efficient in the production of intermediate goods and entails higher fixed 
costs – including entry, product design, and the cost of running a larger 
company; a pair of specialized producers suffers, instead, from transaction 
costs, due to the contractual incompleteness governing their relationship. 
In the basic version of their model, Grossmann and Helpman (2002) make 
the assumption that intermediate inputs are fully tailored to a particular 
product, which implies the absence of outside option for both IS and FP and 
a potential hold up concern by the specialized input supplier. Following the 
                                                 
9 Immobility of final goods is assumed to isolate the market thickness principle from the 
standard product-market competition effect 
10 As in the simple model, sketched in Section 2.1, intermediate goods may be of high quality 
or low quality; although the latter can be produced at a negligible cost, only the former can be 
converter into final products.   12 
same mechanism as in Section 2.1, the input supplier foresees its weak 
position in the ex post bargaining, because its relation specific-investment x  
is already sunk at the renegotiation stage, and it tends to under-invest. 
Apart from this standard discussion, by endogenizing the industry structure, 
Grossman and Helpman (2002) are able to capture the impact of a new factor 
a, the degree of substitutability among a given industry’s final goods, and a 
more complex influence by  w, IS’s bargaining power, on the relative 
prevalence of Integration versus Outsourcing. 
The effect of a is twofold: according to the model, as long as final goods 
become less differentiated, specialized firms have higher probability of 
getting matched, which encourages Outsourcing then, depending on some 
parameters value, an increase in a may increase or decrease the operating 
profits of specialized firms, pushing towards Outsourcing  in the first case, 
and Integration, in the second one; therefore, the overall effect of product 
differentiation is not always the same. 
As far as the distribution of the bargaining power between IS and FP is 
concerned,  w affects the relative prevalence of Outsourcing through three 
channels: 1) an increase in the bargaining power of IS, by increasing the 
profit share accruing to the specialized input producer, naturally pushes 
towards Outsourcing; 2) an increase in w also reduces the distortion caused 
by imperfect contracting and increases the profitability of IS firms, leading 
again to an O-solution; 3) by increasing the number of intermediate good 
producers and reducing the number of final good producers, a higher  w 
lowers the probability of matching between specialized firms, thus 
encouraging Integration. What they show is that for w very small – when 
incentives for IS are too low - and for w very high – when input producers 
have little chances to find a partner, because they are too many, compared to 
final  good producers – Integration dominates, while for intermediate values 
of w, Outsourcing emerges.  
In Grossman and Helpman (1999, 2002), an interesting extension of this 
model is discussed, by removing the crucial assumption that inputs must be 
fully tailored to a particular final good and allowing for endogenous 
specialization of components. Now both parties have an outside option and, 
in selecting input specificity, intermediate good producers trade off the 
benefits of having a highly specialized component, which is of maximal 
value to the customer for whom it was designed, with the benefits of a more 
standard component that, due to its flexibility, is more valuable for 
alternative uses.   
As far as the ownership decision  – Integration versus Outsourcing  - is 
concerned, all previous results hold; this new formalisation, however, allows 
the authors to capture the additional role of b, a new parameter that indicates 
the importance of input specificity in the industry under consideration. The 
more sensitive the manufacturing costs to detailed characteristics of inputs, 
the more costly the inefficiency arising from partial specialization, which 
tends to reduce the viability of Outsourcing; at the same time, an increase in 
specificity reduces the equilibrium volume of intermediate goods and 
enhances the bargaining power of each IS-firm in its bilateral relation with a 
final producer: this makes entry by specialized input producers more 
profitable and may push equilibrium towards Outsourcing in cases where 
costs are highly sensitive to input specifications. 
The great novelty of McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (1999, 
2002) is that they provide a bridge between ideas, originally developed in a   13 
context of Organization Theory, and the International Economics setting of 
industry and general equilibrium, although they model only the domestic 
dimension of Internalisation. 
A further step, towards a deeper understanding of the trade off between FDI 
and arm’s length trade, is made in Grossman and Helpman (2003), where the 
location decision  – Domestic versus International Outsourcing  – is 
endogenized in a general equilibrium model.  
The crucial assumption that it is too expensive to manufacture components, 
by a firm itself, rules out the Integration solution but allows the authors to 
concentrate on the location issue, that was previously ignored. 
Outsourcing means more than buying raw materials: in order for arm’s 
length trade to occur,  final good producers need to find a partner – as close 
as possible to their input requirements – and convince the partner to make a 
relation-specific investment in customisation – i.e. adaptation of components 
to final goods. 
Grossman and Helpman (2003)  design a two countries – North and South – 
two goods  –  z and y  – model in which intermediate inputs and the 
homogeneous consumption good z can be produced in both countries, while 
only the North has the know how to assemble intermediate components into 
final differentiated consumption goods y, according to a simple technology 
that requires one unit of customized input to produce one unit of y. 
All final good producers are thus located in the North and they simply 
decides whether to outsource production of inputs within the same country – 
Domestic Outsourcing – or in the South – International Outsourcing. 
The game proceeds in three steps: entry, search and bargaining; while stage 
1 and 2 simply resemble our previous discussion, stage 3 is worth explaining 
in a few words, because some elements of novelty are introduced. 
Bargaining occurs in two steps: first of all, the parties bargain over the 
supplier’s investment in customisation – i.e. the development of a prototype 
– and the compensation for the prototype; the more the distance between 
IS’s expertise and the input requirements, posed by FP, the more expensive 
the customisation
11. Bargaining over the investment contract is governed by 
an incomplete contract setting, where IS’s investment is only partly 
verifiable by a Court: differently from previous models - where contracts 
were simply complete or incomplete  – here the  extent of contractual 
incompleteness is explicitly captured by a parameter g - different from North 
to South – that indicates the fraction of IS’s investment verifiable by a third 
party, reflecting the state of the legal system. Notice that the prototype is 
valuable only inside the relation, leaving both parties with no outside option 
in the Nash bargaining. A second stage bargaining follows, and firms discuss 
over the order contract, namely the quantity and price of an input: this stage 
is governed by complete contracts because, after IS has sunk his investment 
in the prototype, the partners have coincident interests and they can therefore 
write an efficient contract on the exchange of components.    
                                                 
11 As in the extention of Grossman and Helpman (1999, 2002), a two-dimensional 
representation of the space of input characteristics is given along a circle in which all points 
are input requirements of final producers and expertise of suppliers.   14 
In trading off Domestic versus International Outsourcing, final good 
producers consider a number of factors, namely country size, search 
technology, customizing technology and contracting environment
12.  
First of all, the model shows that, as the South expands, its market becomes 
“thicker” and, other things being equal, its share of world outsourcing grows 
because firms prefer to search in a thick market, since the probability of 
finding a suitable partner is higher. 
As far as the search technology is concerned, we need to distinguish between 
two cases: while a worldwide improvement in search technology has no 
effect on the outsourcing decision, a disproportionate progress in 
communication, PC usage or else in the South increases international 
Outsourcing because firms prefer to search in a country where infrastructure 
for communication are more developed. 
Similar results are derived for the customizing technology, that determines a 
partner’s willingness to undertake the needed investment in a prototype: a 
worldwide improvement in customizing technology does not affect the 
location decision, while a disproportionate progress in one country tends to 
push outsourcing there. 
Another crucial aspect is represented by the contracting environment, 
because it affects firms’ ability to induce their partners to invest in the 
relation. Improvements in the contracting possibilities in one country 
increase the relative profitability of outsourcing there and affects the demand 
for labour by component producers and final producers at a given wage. 
Grossman and Helpman (2003) show that a global increase in  g favours 
Domestic Outsourcing, while an improvement in the Southern legal system, 
while raising outsourcing from the North, may well increase or decrease 
International Outsourcing. 
Although this model cannot be used to study the make-or-buy decision, it 
represents a crucial step between Grossman and Helpman (2002) and 
McLaren (2000)  – focused on the domestic ownership choice  – and the 
models discussed below, because the international dimension is explicitly 
delineated. 
Grossman and Helpman (2004a) consider the  international ownership 
decision – FDI versus International Outsourcing -  in a general equilibrium 
framework, under the crucial assumption that it is cheaper to produce 
components in the South, while final goods are designed and assembled in 
the North, which rules out  any domestic organisational choice. 
They build on Grossman and Helpman (2002), as far as the internalisation 
trade off is concerned, and Grossman and Helpman (2003), for the 
international dimension modelling and general equilibrium setting. 
Following the same reasoning as before, the choice between FDI and 
International Outsourcing results, at a preliminary analysis, in the standard 
trade off between governance and transaction costs: a pair of specialized 
firms is more efficient in manufacturing components, while an integrated 
firm, by internalising input production, may correct IS under-investment in 
customisation, in a setting of incomplete contracts. 
The timing is the same as in the p revious models, and Nash bargaining 
covers again the two aspects of investment contract and order contract, as in 
Grossman and Helpman (2003); no party has an outside option because FP 
                                                 
12 Notice that this trade off is not resolved through the usual comparison between transaction 
and governance costs, because final good producers are engaged in a location, not ownership 
decision.   15 
may approach any supplier, but just one: by assumption, if the negotiation 
fails, none of the two firms has time to find another partner. Contractual 
incompleteness, governing the bargaining over the investment contract, is 
again captured by the parameter g, which reflects the state of the legal 
system. 
The general equilibrium setting allows the authors to study the effect of a 
number of key variables – other than governance and transaction costs – on 
the relative prevalence of FDI versus International Outsourcing. 
In particular, they derive mixed equilibria in which some firms outsource to 
the South, and some other undertake FDI, depending on the distance 
between IS and FP in the space of characteristics:  if the final good producer 
and the input supplier are close to each other, they are likely to engage in 
Outsourcing, if they are instead far away, they choose FDI. 
They also find that an increase in the productivity advantage of specialized 
producers l, an increase in industry size, and a better legal system favour the 
relative prevalence of Outsourcing, while an increase in the relative wage in 
the South encourages FDI.  
Grossman and Helpman (2004a) provide a rich framework to analyse the 
make-or-buy decision, explaining why firms should operate a direct 
investment in a foreign country or simply outsource some activities; 
however, the international dimension of the choice is completely exogenous, 
while we could be interested in combining both the ownership and location 
decision in a single model. 
The first attempt at studying these two dimensions together, in a coherent 
and unitary framework, is due to Antras (2003), where the choice of FDI, 
with respect to International Outsourcing, crucially hinges on the capital 
abundance of the supplying country and the capital intensity of the traded 
input. 
The background is represented by the Property Right Theory of the Firm and 
incomplete contracts – as far as the ownership decision is concerned – and 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) modelling of imperfect competition and 
product differentiation, for the location issue. 
While the models discussed so far basically employed the very simple 
mechanism, sketched in Section 2.1, Antras (2003) introduces a couple of 
interesting variations that are worth commenting in a few words.  
Fist of all, as in the original spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and 
Moore (1990), Nash bargaining takes place also within an integrated firm; 
moreover, Antras (2003) introduces a notion of transferability of investment 
decisions, whose impact on the two parties’ outside option is discussed in 
details. 
His intuition is quite simple: if IS’s default option is very low, the allocation 
of residual control rights may not be enough to induce sufficient levels of 
investment by the input supplier, resulting in a severe hold up problem that 
may be alleviated if the final good  producer contributes to the supplier 
relation specific investment. 
In the model, two sets of differentiated consumption goods - y and z – can be 
produced by means of two inputs – labour (L) and physical capital (K) – 
according to a simple technology that employs K and L to manufacture 
specialized inputs xy and x z which are linearly assembled into final products; 
by assumption, only high quality specialized components may be used to 
produce final goods while low quality inputs – although they can be obtained 
at a negligible cost – cannot be converted into y nor z.   16 
These assumptions allow for a richer set of components: while in previous 
models the only input was labour, here production of final goods requires 
both L and K, where labour must be supplied by IS  but K may be 
contributed by either of the two parties. This is the essence of the investment 
sharing mechanism introduced by Antras (2003), and referred to physical 
capital only, on the base on empirical evidence (see, for example: Dunning 
1993, Milgrom and Roberts (1993), Aoki (1990)). 
The game is organized in five stages: 1) choice of ownership and decision on 
who rents capital; 2) K and L are chosen simultaneously and non 
cooperatively; 3) production of intermediate goods x y and x z; 4) generalized 
Nash bargaining 5) production and sales of final goods. 
Differently from previous models, an integrated firm is assumed to be as 
efficient as a pair of specialized producers: the only difference between the 
Outsourcing and the Integration case lays in the  residual control rights. In 
the first case, IS is “owner”, in the sense that he has control over the amount 
of input produced so, if FP fires the supplying firm, she looses also the 
inputs produced whereas, in the second case, IS is not owner, namely he has 
no control right over x, which means that FP may fire the managers of the 
supplying firm, seizing at least a fraction of his production. 
To understand how the model works, in this more complex setting, it is 
crucial to distinguish between two cases: when the  supplier incurs all 
variable costs, a standard hold up problem emerges and IS’s under-
investment is related to the weakness of his ex post bargaining power w; 
when, instead, there is investment sharing, a two-sided hold up problem 
arises because the investment in K is specific to the pair so also FP feels 
locked in. 
In particular, there is an asymmetry between FP and IS in terms of outside 
option, depending on the ownership structure: while the input supplier has 
zero outside option whatever the organisational form, in case of Integration, 
if the two parties do not agree over the exchange, FP secures herself an 
outside option by firing IS but seizing his production. 
By embedding this richer apparatus in a general equilibrium framework à la 
Krugman and Helpman (1985), Antras (2003) derives two interesting results, 
from the interaction between comparative advantages and transaction costs 
minimization: first of all, K-intensive goods – characterized by high cost 
sharing - are transacted within the boundaries of multinational firms, while 
L-intensive goods tend to be traded at arm’s length; moreover, transactions 
from K-abundant countries take place through FDI, while transactions with 
K-scarce countries are arranged through International Outsourcing. These 
results find a strong support in the data: by regressing the share of intra-firm 
imports over total US imports, on industry and country characteristics, factor 
endowment and factor intensity turn out to be statistically significant in all 
the different specifications of the econometric model. 
Although Antras (2003) makes a preliminary introduction of location issues, 
his paper still focuses  on the comparison between Integration and 
Outsourcing at an international level, as it is clear from the data used for 
econometric tests. 
The choice of FDI versus arms’ length trade depends, in part, on country 
characteristics, so we can predict that different organizational forms will 
prevail in transacting with different countries, according to their K -
abundance, but this framework does not allow us to make the last step and 
explain why a firm should decide whether to outsource or integrate either 
domestically  or abroad:  this step is made in Antras and Helpman (2004)   17 
where location and ownership decisions are endogenized in the same general 
equilibrium framework. 
In their paper, FP firms – located in the North, by assumption – in order to 
obtain intermediate goods, choose an “organizational form” which consists 
of an ownership structure – Integration versus Outsourcing – and a location 
decision – Home versus Foreign - resulting in four alternatives:  Domestic 
Integration, FDI, Domestic Outsourcing or International Outsourcing. 
The model bases on two strands of literature: Melitz
13 (2003) inspired the 
location solution, abandoning the representative agent framework and 
allowing for heterogeneity - in terms of productivity - across firms operating 
in the same sector, while the incomplete contract  background, to analyse the 
ownership decision, is derived from Antras (2003). 
An important novelty is introduced here, with respect to previous models: 
production of final goods requires two inputs
14 – headquarter services h and 
manufactured components m – each of them controlled by one of the two 
parties engaged in the economic relation. I n particular, input h can be 
produced only in the North and only FP firms have the know how to 
contribute headquarter services, while input m can be produced in either 
country, according to a linear technology that employs one unit of labour to 
obtain one unit of manufactured component; since wage rate is lower in the 
South than in the North, production of m is cheaper there
15. Under these 
assumptions, final good producers, in the North, supply h by themselves, but 
they need to contract with a manufacturer – either in the North or in the 
South – for the provision of m. 
Antras and Helpman (2004) model a five-stage game based on: 1) entry and 
simultaneous decisions of ownership and location; 2) search, upon which 
fixed organizational costs - higher in the North, and in Outsourcing - are 
paid; 3) production of intermediate goods; 4) ex post Nash bargaining; 5) 
production of final goods. 
As in Antras (2003), Nash bargaining occurs both in case of Integration and 
Outsourcing, but the distribution of surplus is sensitive to the mode of 
organization: under an O-form, no party has an outside option - namely if 
they agree, FP keeps (1-w) and IS obtains w of the ex post surplus, if the do 
not agree, they have zero; under Integration, the final good producer has a 
stronger position than the input supplier because, in case of disagreement, 
she can fire IS, while seizing a fraction of his m production. 
In choosing between Domestic and Foreign suppliers, final good producers 
trade off the benefits of a lower variable costs in the South, with the benefits 
                                                 
13 Melitz (2003) models the relationship between a sector exposure to international trade and 
its structure and performance, allowing for heterogeneity across firms in the same sector. He 
finds that the exposure to international trade leads more productive firms to export and less 
productive firms to exit the market; a further increase in the industry’s exposure to trade 
induces an intra industry reallocation in favour of more productive firms. This explains why 
international trade may generate aggregate productivity gains without necessarily improving 
the productive efficiency of individual firms. 
14 In Antras (2003) two inputs – L and K - are needed to obtain intermediate goods, but only 
one type of intermediate good  - either x y or xz, depending on the final good - is required to 
produce final goods; here, instead, two kinds of intermediate goods  - m and h - are needed to 
be converted into final products. 
15 This assumption means that the technology to manufacture component m is the same, 
whatever the ownership structure  - as in Antras (2003)  – while the only difference in 
efficiency is “spatial”, because, whatever the ownership structure, producing m in the South is 
cheaper than in the North.  
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of lower fixed organizational costs in the North; in choosing between 
Integration and Outsourcing, they trade off the benefits of ownership from 
vertical integration, with the benefits of better incentives for the 
manufacturer under outsourcing. 
Notice that this model is particularly rich in that it considers three lines of 
heterogeneity: sectors differ in headquarter service-intensity, so that we 
distinguish between high and low tech industries; firms differ in their 
productivity level  q, and countries differ in terms of organizational and 
variable costs. 
By exploiting these lines of heterogeneity in a general equilibrium 
framework,  the authors come to an important conclusion. In low tech 
sectors, Integration never occurs: firms with higher productivity outsource in 
the South, while firms with lower q outsource in the North; in high tech 
sectors, we may observe any of the four organizational forms: firms with 
higher productivity buy inputs from the South, firms with lower  q, buy 
inputs from the North; among firms that buy inputs from the same country, 
higher productivity firms integrate, lower productivity firms outsource. 
The degree of productivity dispersion and the headquarter service intensity 
are shown to be relevant in determining the relative prevalence of alternative 
organizational forms. In particular, Antras and Helpman (2004) prove that 
sectors with more dispersion of productivity rely more on imports and, 
among the high tech producers that acquire inputs in a particular country, the 
number of integrated firms is higher, with respect to the number of 
outsourcing firms, the more dispersed the productivity within the sector; 
moreover, high tech sectors  rely less on imports and, among high tech 
producers that acquire inputs in a particular country, the number of 
integrated firms is higher, the more headquarter-intensive the sector. 
In endogenizing both location and ownership concerns, this paper offers the 
richest characterization of the organizational choice in the set of models 
reviewed so far, nonetheless it sheds lights only on the comparison between 
FDI and some forms of partnering  – domestically or abroad  – without 
considering a broader menu of contractual arrangements. 
Ottaviano and Turrini (2003) introduce outsourcing contracts in an otherwise 
standard model of multinational firms, based on the proximity-concentration 
trade off (see, for example: Krugman (1983); Horstmann and Markusen 
(1992); Markusen and Venables (2000)), in order to explain the decision to 
undertake FDI or export
16, in terms of distance and market size. 
Production of a differentiated consumption good y consists of two activities: 
upstream manufacturing of intermediate inputs, and downstream assembly.  
They explicitly rule out the location decision, by considering a local market 
where final goods are supplied only by foreign firms, which make their 
organizational decisions in two steps. First of all, they choose whether to 
export final products to the local market, or to engage in FDI; it is crucial to 
notice that FDI, in this paper, covers the two possibilities of “self 
production” and “outsourcing”: in the first case, intermediate components 
                                                 
16 FDI and export are treated, here, as substitutes, but it does not need to be the case:  in Rob 
and Vettas (2003), a dynamic modelling is provided to generate the time-paths of export and 
FDI. Due to demand uncertainty and irreversibility of investments, multinationals are shown 
to use export, to explore future demand, and lately turn to FDI to supply the products more 
economically, once demand is known. Notice that uncertainty is introduced also in Hanson 
(1995), but in a completely different way: Mexican firms are assumed to choose their 
ownership arrangement (at a domestic level) by trading off the minimization of the hold up 
risk, under Integration, and the diversification of the natural risk, under Outsourcing.    19 
are manufactured at home by the multinational firm and shipped to local 
assembling lines – it is the FDI à la Grossman-Helpman-Antras – while, in 
the second case, the multinational firm outsources input production to a local 
supplier  – it is the  International Outsourcing à la Grossman-Helpman-
Antras
17. Firms that engage in FDI then decide, as a second step, whether to 
self produce or outsource. 
In choosing between export and FDI, final good producers trade off the low 
governance costs, associated to the first option, with the low trade costs, 
implied by the second one, resembling the standard proximity-concentration 
argument: firms invest abroad when the gain from avoiding transportation 
costs out-weights the cost of maintaining capacity in multiple markets. 
In choosing between self-production and outsourcing, multinational firms 
trade off the low cost of managing distant operations, related to the first 
option, with the low trade costs of arm’s length trade, in a context of 
contractual incompleteness and double-sided hold up problem
18. 
This arises because both parties make relation-specific investments under 
outsourcing: intermediate goods, supplied by IS, are fully tailored to a 
particular final product and FP, by assumption,  needs to make a relation 
specific investment in the assembly line; while the multinational firm has an 
outside option, in case of self- production, a local input producer has none, 
whatever the organizational solution adopted in the second stage. 
The main result of the model is that trade costs affect both steps of 
organizational decision: for high values of the trade costs, the proximity-
concentration trade off dominates and FDI are chosen when the distance 
between the home and the local market is large; for low values of the trade 
costs, the contractual incompleteness trade off dominates: on the one hand, 
export seems more appealing, on the other hand, the outside option resulting 
from self production is also strengthened which makes outsourcing more 
profitable from the point of view of the final good producer. 
Ottaviano and Turrini (2003) show that, if market size is large enough, this 
outside option effect may prevail over the proximity-concentration argument, 
eventually leading to a non-monotonic relation between FDI and distance, in 
countries with large markets
19: put another way, foreign direct investments 
may emerge both for high and low values of trade costs, in line with the 
empirical evidence. 
This paper  concludes our survey of Archetype 1-based models and, together 
with Antras and Helpman (2004), offers the most complete understanding of 
Internalisation: here a richer set of contractual agreements – export, FDI, 
                                                 
17 In both cases, production of final goods is due to the multinational firm and it takes place in 
the local market: the only difference lays in production of intermediate components, which is 
due to an independent supplier and takes place in the local market under outsourcing, while it 
is due to the multinational firm and takes place in the home market, under self-production. 
18 Similarly to Ottaviano and Turrini (2003), Helpman et al. (2004) base on a proximity-
concentration argument to explain the choice between FDI and export, through a multi-
country, multi-sector general equilibrium model. Instead of depicting an incomplete contract 
setting, intra-industry heterogeneity of firms à la Melitz is assumed and it interacts with 
distance in driving the way of serving a foreign market. Only the most productive firms are 
shown to engage in foreign activities and, among them, only the most productive undertake 
FDI; the extent of intra-industry heterogeneity is proved to affect the volume of FDI sales 
over export, both theoretically and empirically. The proximity-concentration hypothesis is 
employed also in Brainard (1997), and combined with the factor-proportion hypothesis to 
stress empirically the role of distance in explaining the trade off between FDI and export. 
19 Since the outside option effect is entirely due to the hold up problem, non monotonicity 
disappears under contractual completeness, as it is shown in the paper.   20 
International Outsourcing  – is modelled, while taking as given the 
international dimension of the problem; in Antras and Helpman (2004), an 
opposite perspective is adopted because ownership and location issues are 
combined in a unitary and coherent framework, but just two options – FDI 
versus partnering with an independent supplier – are considered
20.  
































3. Alternative approaches 
In this section, we discuss a few models of FDI and Internalisation, based on 
alternative theories of the firm, in which worker’s incentives play a central 
role in designing the optimal organizational form. 
Keeping the same structure as before, we first describe the basic intuition 
from the underlying theories of the firm - summarized in Archetype 2 and 
Archetype 3 – then we present models of FDI in which that intuition  has 
                                                 
20 A richer array of choices of international organisations is offered in Grossman et al. (2004): 
following Yeaple (2003) and Ekholm et al. (2003), they go beyond the traditional distinction 
between horizontal and vertical FDI (see, for example, Markusen 2002) to account for the 
evidence that, with many countries and many stages of production, some organizational forms 
do not fit neatly into either of these categories. This paper is not covered by the present survey 
because the boundaries of multinational  firms are taken as given, and the make-or-buy 
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been employed to study the make-or-buy decision, at an international level. 
Given the limited number of contributions within these fields, we decided to 
keep the discussion intuitive, without adding formalisation. 
 
3.1.1 Archetype 2: The firm as an Incentive System 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) provide an interesting view of the firm - as 
an incentive system  – in response to the limitations of previous theories, 
criticised for being incomplete and unidimensional. 
According to them, the standard make-or-buy decision cannot be fully 
explained in terms of ownership of assets – as in the Grossman-Hart-Moore 
framework – or monitoring and worker compensation – as in Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), Holmstrom (1982) –  or employer’s discretion over his 
employees activities  – as in Coase (1937) and Simon (1951): indeed, a 
comprehensive analysis of the boundaries of the firm requires a combination 
of asset ownership and contingent rewards and job restrictions, because they 
all have an influence on workers’ incentives, and the way they exert effort. 
Consider our typical situation in which final good production requires 
intermediate components: inputs can be produced either internally, by an 
employee – under the employer’s direction, using the employer’s tools and 
being paid a fixed wage – or externally, by an independent contractor who 
chooses his tools and methods and who is paid proportionally to the quantity 
supplied. As in  Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), we call the first case inside 
procurement, or employment contract,  and the second one  outside 
procurement or supply contract: notice that the former resembles Integration, 
while the latter represents Outsourcing, according to our previous 
terminology (Section 2). 
The authors argue that these two arrangements emerge as a r esult of two 
alternative systems for managing incentives, across the wide array of tasks 
for which a single worker is responsible.  
Broadly speaking, firms may use three main types of instruments for each 
incentive system: 1) asset ownership, which consists in letting an agent own 
a set of productive assets; 2) contingent reward, according to which workers 
are paid based on their measured performance; 3) job restrictions, namely 
the specification of job rules, working hours and similar policies to restrict or 
enhance workers’ freedom from direct control. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) make the crucial assumption of  task 
substitutability, according to which workers view the different tasks, for 
which they are responsible, as substitutes. This intuitively suggests a 
complementarity link among the three instruments described above: 
increasing agents’ incentives for just one task could cause the worker to 
devote too much effort on that specific task, while neglecting other aspects 
of his job, therefore the three instruments should be balanced, to keep the 
various incentives in balance, as well. 
This intuition is formalized in the multitask dynamic principal-agent model 
set in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987;1991), where incentive instruments are 
endogenous variables, and exogenous parameters  – such as the cost of 
measuring performance, asset specificity and uncertainty about the future – 
are introduced to see whether their variation leads to co-movements in the 
instruments – in which case complementarity should be confirmed - or not. 
The main result of their model – in line with the empirical evidence reported 
by Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Anderson (1985) - is that outside 
procurement (Outsourcing) tends to be characterized by high powered 
incentives  – namely high asset ownership, high commission rates, more   22 
freedom and more emphasis on direct sales measurement – whereas inside 
procurement emerges when workers earn a fixed wage and use firms’ tools. 
 
3.1.2 From Archetype 2 to FDI and Internalisation 
As we discussed in Section 2.2, Feenstra and Hanson (2003) model firms’ 
decision to undertake FDI versus International Outsourcing in terms of 
managerial incentives and property rights. We have already focused on their 
G-H-M-based model so, in what follows, we move our attention to the one 
designed in the spirit of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994). 
Recall the economic situation in which a multinational firm (f) and a local 
firm (g) are linked by export processing operations; production of final 
goods requires intermediate components – that can be purchased by either of 
the two firms – and takes place within the local factory, under either an 
employment or a supply contract. 
Notice that this setting is completely analogous to the one sketched in 
Section 2.2, so we simply refer to our previous description, as far as the 
organisational forms and the timing are concerned. 
Differently from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), where efforts were related 
to managers only, here e3 rests with f, e2 rests with g, while e1 lies with 
either of the two parties, depending on the assembly regime; according to the 
formulation of the problem, d1 and d2 are the only instruments to design g’s 
incentives to exert effort. 
The choice on who owns the factory implies the adoption of different 
contractual arrangements, namely an employment contract, under FDI, and a 
supply contract, under Outsourcing. In the first case f pays the local firm an 
amount T, provided that g has exerted effort e2, and e1 if g controls input 
purchase; by assumption, the multinational can verify efforts only up to 
some levels e1^ and e2^. In the second case, f agrees to pay g a transfer price 
T if the local firm delivers one unit of the processed input to the foreign 
firm. 
Call W d1,d2(e1,e2,e3) the total surplus of the project, depending on the 
efforts exerted by the two parties, when the organizational form (d1,d2) is 
chosen; Feenstra and Hanson (2003) show that W is supermodular, namely 
W0,0 + W1,1 > W0,1 + W1,0 , therefore, in this framework, it is often optimal 
for the same firm to own the processing factory and to control the inputs 
used in the export processing: ownership and control are proved to be 
complementary instruments, as in H -M; however, the same empirical 
evidence,  reported in Section 2.2, is strongly inconsistent with this 
theoretical prediction since export processing operations are shown to be 
characterized by foreign ownership of the processing factory, and Chinese 
control over input purchase. 
Feenstra and Hanson (2004) make an interesting attempt at combining both 
the property right and the incentive system approach  – considered as 
alternative, in Feenstra and Hanson (2003) - in a single model, by assuming 
that the two parties’ efforts can be verified only with probability (1-f), so 
that a first-best contract is enforceable, while with probability f there is no 
verifiability and no contract, in which case profits are split according to Nash 
bargaining. By assumption, the two parties’ outside options are decreasing 
functions of  y, which measures the specificity of the human-capital 
investment by either firm in the project. 
In this richer framework, whether ownership and control should rest with the 
same party or not, depends on some parameter values: when human capital   23 
specificity is low, value added is high and the bargaining weight of the 
multinational (1-w) is high, f can ameliorate the hold up problem by 
transferring input control to g, whose incentive to make relation specific-
investments increases, even if it does not own the local factory; on the 
contrary, when y is high, value added is low, or (1-w) is low, ownership and 
control should be given to the same party.  
Chinese data support the finding that ownership and control are shared 
between f and g, and this evidence appears even more clearly when the 
authors consider subsets of data on export through Hong Kong, or that 
exclude interior provinces. 
As we have already stressed in Section 2.2, Feenstra and Hanson make an 
interesting step in comparing (2003) and combining (2004) different theories 
of the firm to explain the  Internalisation issue, but the international 
dimension of the analysis is completely taken as given, without any attempt 
at building an industry or general equilibrium model, nor at considering 
multi-agent relationships. 
This step is achieved by Grossman and Helpman (2004b) who build on 
Archetype 2, and analyse the emergence of the four organisational forms – 
resulting from the intersection of ownership and location decisions - as an 
industry equilibrium outcome. 
They model a standard situation in which production of final goods requires 
intermediate components; by assumption, only final good producers (FP) 
have the know how to assemble final products, but only input suppliers (IS) 
have the technology to realize components.  
IS supplies inputs either under inside procurement (Integration) - being a 
division of FP  - or under outside procurement (Outsourcing)  - as an 
independent entrepreneur. 
Notice that this setting entails an interesting difference, with respect to the 
models reviewed in Section 2, because input production rests with IS only, 
and FP, even under Integration, cannot manufacture the needed components 
by herself
21.  
The inside procurement is characterized by an amount s that the final good 
producer promises to the input supplier, whatever happens and an amount po 
that is paid to the entrepreneur in case he is able to provide the needed 
components; the external procurement specifies an effort level e^ that IS is 
expected to exert on all monitorable tasks, a wage payment w, irrespective of 
the outcome of the project, and a bonus b, received by IS in case the project 
succeeds. 
In choosing between supply and employment contract, final good producers 
trade off monitoring and cost considerations: since input manufacturing 
requires effort, Integration allows FP to monitor, at least, a fraction e of the 
tasks for which IS is responsible, while under Outsourcing no monitoring is 
possible at all; since input manufacturing requires a cost c, other than effort, 
                                                 
21 In Feenstra and Hanson (2003) inputs are not manufactured, but bought, by either of the 
two parties, while final good production rests with the local firm, differently from Grossman 
and Helpman (2004b) and the models reviewed in Section 2. Notice that, among Archetype1 
based-models, Grossman and Helpman (2004a) make a similar assumption – by saying that it 
is too expensive to manufacture components w ithin firms’ boundaries  -   to rule out 
ownership concerns and concentrate only on location issues; in Grossman and Helpman 
(2004b), due to the different framework (Archetype2), this hypothesis is completely 
compatible with a richer characterisation of the organisational decision, where ownership and 
location are combined. 
   24 
under Integration, c is born by FP, while it accrues to IS in case of 
Outsourcing. 
In order to add the location dimension to the previous analysis, the authors 
distinguish between two countries – the North, where inputs are assembled 
into final products and the South – and they assume that monitoring is easier 
in North (e
S<e
N) and that costs c are lower in the South (c
S<c
N). 
In combining ownership and location decisions, as in Antras and Helpman 
(2004), four organisational alternatives emerge: production of intermediate 
components may rest with a manager, within the domestic firm’s boundaries 
(Domestic Integration), or operating in a foreign subsidiary ( FDI); 
alternatively, it may rest with an independent entrepreneur, giving rise to 
Domestic Outsourcing, if he operates in the North, or  International 
Outsourcing, if he operates in the South.  
Firms heterogeneity à la Melitz  is introduced in this setting, by assuming 
that, upon entry, firms draw a productivity level q from a known distribution 
G(q). 
As far as the ownership decision is concerned, Outsourcing is shown to be 
preferred by the most and least productive final good producers, while 
Integration emerges for intermediate values of q; moreover, among firms 
that integrate, those that decide to  keep their divisions close to the 
headquarter are potentially more productive than those that engage in FDI. 
By designing an industry equilibrium model, Grossman and Helpman 
(2004b) are able to assess the impact of reduced transportation costs and 
improvements in monitoring in the South on the relative prevalence of 
different organisational forms. They show that trade liberalisation  may 
boost the prevalence of Outsourcing or FDI - depending on whether the 
industry is one in which Outsourcing is done by the least or the most 
productive firms - while improvements in monitoring distant managers result 
in an increased market share for multinational corporations, and a decline in 
the market shares of components produced under Domestic Integration and 
Domestic Outsourcing.   
Although inspired by a different theory of the firm, this paper is quite close 
to Antras and Helpman (2004) since it offers a complete characterisation of 
Internalisation - as a result of ownership and location concerns - while the 
link with Archetype 2 appears less tight than in Feenstra and Hanson (2003): 
even if Grossman and Helpman (2004b) derive the same conclusion as 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994)  - because the optimal contract for a 
potential supplier often provide higher powered incentives, than the one for a 
manager - this strictly depends on the restrictions put on payments and the 
assumptions on who bears the input production costs under inside and 
outside procurement.  
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3.2.1 Archetype 3: Formal and Real Authority in Organisations 
Aghion and Tirole (1997)’s famous theory of the firm arises from an 
interesting re-thinking of the concept of “authority”. 
In the G-H-M framework, authority originates from ownership of physical 
assets, giving the owner control rights – or formal authority - over decisions 
concerning the use of her own asset. However, in the real world, formal 
authority does not necessarily confer real authority, namely effective control 
over decisions. 
The separation between formal and real authority, that emerges in Aghion 
and Tirole (1997), crucially hinges on informational asymmetries between a 
principal (P, she) and an agent (A, he), who is hired to collect information 
and potentially implement a project, while congruence parameters measure 
the extent to which A and P have aligned interests in terms of preferable 
projects. 
Notice that each project entails a verifiable monetary benefit for the risk 
neutral principal and a private benefit for the risk averse agent. 
For each party, at least one project is associated to a negative payoff, so that 
an uninformed party has no incentive to pick a project at random, rather she 
prefers to rubber-stamp the informed party’s proposal, or do nothing, in case 
they are both uninformed. 
Information acquisition is costly and entails a private cost – different for A 
and P – which is an increasing and convex function of the effort exerted by 
the party; P and A are assumed to collect information simultaneously. 
In a setting of incomplete contracts  - because the allocation of formal 
authority is the only point that can be set ex ante - two organisational 
arrangements may emerge, depending on whether the principal or the agent 
has formal authority: the first case is called P -organisation (Integration, 
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The two parties’ optimal efforts, in acquiring information, are inversely 
proportional: the higher the initiative by A, the lower the effort exerted by P 
and vice versa; moreover, each player is shown to put higher effort when she 
has formal authority, because she cannot be overruled by the other party. 
The choice between P-organisation and A-organisation is thus governed by a 
trade off between control and initiative: the benefit of delegation lays in the 
increased effort by the agent, but this comes at the cost of reducing P’s 
control; anticipating this, the principal tends to under-invest in information 
acquisition. 
Notice that this model provides a two-way interaction between authority and 
information: information acquisition is endogenously affected by formal 
authority and endogenously affects real authority within organisations
22. 
 
3.2.2 From Archetype 3 to FDI and Internalisation 
Marin and Verdier (2002; 2003a; 2003b) focus on recent stylised facts to 
explain the enormous changes that globalisation has prompted in the nature 
of the firm: on the one hand, conglomerates have broken down, and decision 
making has become more and more decentralized (2002); on the other hand, 
human capital has increasingly replaced physical capital as the key asset 
within modern corporations (2003a). 
To account for these epochal changes, the authors combine A-T view of the 
firm, with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) modelling of monopolistic competition, 
in a general equilibrium analysis. 
In Marin and Verdier (2002), firms’ organisational choices – Integration 
versus Outsourcing  - are related to variations in the degree of product 
differentiation a. 
In the partial equilibrium framework, resembling Archetype 3, decisions are 
taken according to the following sequence: 1) the principal allocates formal 
power to herself (P-organisation) or to the agent (A-organisation); 2) the two 
parties collect information simultaneously; 3) the party who does not have 
formal authority makes a project proposal; 4) the party with formal authority 
selects her favourite projects if informed, rubber-stamps the other party’s 
suggestion if she is uninformed, and the other is informed, while no project 
is undertaken when neither party has information. 
The model is solved by backward induction, and the first stage choice 
between A-form and P-form is crucially driven by Archetype 3-trade off  
between P’s control and A’initiative
23. 
In particular, low profit and high profit firms are shown to opt for a P-
organisation, while at intermediate profit levels, the optimal choice switches 
from P-form to A-form to O-form
24 to A-form. 
                                                 
22 Adding to this formalisation, a monitoring view of the firm is adopted in Aghion and Tirole 
(1995), where the enterprise is considered as a network of core and peripheral units, in order 
to explore the effects of firms’ growth – i.e. increasing scale or scope – on their ownership 
structure and organisational form. In that setting, growth is responsible for an increase in the 
principal’s overload, raising her marginal cost of acquiring information, and prompting a 
massive restructuring where A-organisations emerge for those units that are easier to monitor, 
while the core keeps control rights on the units where it has more expertise or monitoring is 
harder. 
23 Also Puga and Trefler (2002) build on A-T intuition to develop a model in which incentives 
play a key role - as in Marin and Verdier (2002; 2003a; 2003b) - and organisational forms 
result from the intersection of two dimensions - who creates knowledge and who controls 
knowledge.   27 
Notice that the organisational mode matters for incentives only at 
intermediate profit levels: at low profits, the principal monitors little because 
his stake is small, therefore P-form dominates because it gives sufficient 
incentives to the agent and more power to the principal; a similar reasoning 
applies to high profits, since P’s stake is so large that he would intervene a 
lot even under A-form, leading to minimum effort by the agent under both 
arrangements; since the principal has more control under P-form than A-
form, he chooses the first option. While no trade off between control and 
initiative emerges for high and low profits, for intermediate profit levels 
such a trade off shapes firms’ organisational decisions: at the beginning, A-
form dominates to give the agent sufficient initiative but, as long as the 
profit increases, the gains from having an active agent are overcome by the 
loss of control by the principal, and the O -form becomes the optimal 
solution. 
By endogenising profits through the usual free entry condition, the previous 
discussion is embedded in a general equilibrium framework to assess the role 
of market competition  a in designing firms’ profits and explaining the 
choice between Integration and Outsourcing. 
Marin and Verdier (2002) show that as long as a increases, outsourcing and 
merger waves occur, with firms passing from P-form (Integration) to A-form 
(Outsourcing) to a single managed arrangement, with no agent, under O-
form. 
Notice that an equilibrium with Outsourcing emerges, as in Grossman and 
Helpman (2002), at intermediate levels of competition, but the reason is 
quite different: here a feedback mechanism arises due to  strategic 
complementarity among firms - in the sense that the relative attractiveness of 
Integration versus Outsourcing depends on the organisational decisions 
taken by the other players in the market – while in Grossman and Helpman 
(2002) Internalisation has nothing to do with the trade off between control 
and initiative, rather it  lays on the comparison between governance and 
transaction costs. 
Although inspired by different archetypes, we believe that the two papers 
have a similar role in the literature on FDI and Internalisation, because they 
both bridge ideas - traditionally developed within the Theory of the Firm – 
with a setting of International Economics, where the international dimension 
is not yet explicitly delineated.  
Notice, in fact, that the organisational choice modelled in Marin and Verdier 
(2002) is nothing but the domestic ownership decision studied in Grossman 
and Helpman (2002): even if we consider changes in the  international  
market competition, they  are shown to affect the relative prevalence of 
Domestic Integration versus Domestic Outsourcing – namely the make-or-
buy decision within a given country, not across different states. 
In Marin and Verdier (2003a) a new element is added to the previous 
formalisation, in that the emergence of the human capital firm is carefully 
analysed and its implications on the organisational decisions are derived in 
details. 
Following Rajan and Zingales (2000), the authors identify the main features 
of the modern enterprise: while traditional corporations were usually large, 
vertically integrated, and characterized by physical assets,  the human capital 
                                                                                                                   
24 This option, absent in Aghion and Tirole (1997), represents the case in which the principal 
has formal power, and the agent exerts no effort, differently from the so called P-organisation, 
in which P has formal authority and A exerts effort.   28 
organisation is defined in terms of human capital and talent, which are 
responsible for innovation and creation of new ideas. Differently from 
physical capital - which can be legally linked to the firm through ownership - 
human capital i s inalienable and lays with the persons, who need to be 
provided with the right incentives not to leave the organisation they work 
for. 
Why has human capital become so important in the last few decades? Marin 
and Verdier (2003a) identify a novel explanation
25 based on changes in the 
organisation of the corporations: firms respond to improved opportunities of 
human capital outside providing incentives for talents to prevent them from 
leaving their companies. 
In particular, they show that trade integration
26 leads to a “war for talent” 
which is strictly related to the domestic ownership decision. 
The model bases on Archetype 3, as far as the firm description is concerned, 
while the trade setting is derived from Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
Consider two countries – the North, rich in human capital (H), and South, 
rich in labour (L) – and two goods – y, which is human capital intensive, 
heterogeneous and produced under monopolistic competition à la Dixit and 
Stiglits (1977) and z, which is labour intensive, homogeneous and produced 
under perfect competition; notice, moreover, that production of x may occur 
under three different contractual arrangements, namely A-form, P-form and 
O-form. 
Under autarchy, Marin and Verdier (2003a) show that the equilibrium mode 
of organisation depends on countries’ factor endowment:  in countries where 
the L/H ratio is small, Integration dominates, while human capital abundant 
countries tend to organise production through single managed firms (O-
form); for intermediate levels of L/H, Outsourcing (A-form) emerges. 
In the open economy version of their model, L/H changes due to factor price 
equalisation, pushing towards Outsourcing: trade integration puts pressure 
on the demand for skills in rich countries because it creates a war for talent 
and it leads an economy wide shift from low skill intensive organisation (P-
form and O-form) to high skill intensive organisations (A-form). 
Although organisational convergence towards Outsourcing is more likely the 
more the distance, in terms of L/H, between two countries, the previous 
result applies also in case of countries that have similar factor endowment, 
but differ in corporate cultures under autarchy. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Other explanations pointed out, for example, the recent improvements in financial markets 
which has made physical capital easier to obtain, thus reducing its importance within 
organisations (Rajan and Zingales 2002); the diffusion of Information and Communication 
Technologies that require high skilled-employees (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993); or the trade 
integration with low wage countries (Leamer 1993). 
26  The link between trade integration and talent is explored also in Manasse and Turrini 
(2001), where R osen’s (1981) technological view of the firm is embedded in a general 
equilibrium model, based on monopolistic competition. In the authors’ view, globalisation 
may occur via trade integration (i.e. fall in trade barriers and lower transportation costs) or via 
technological change (namely innovations in product and communication technologies that 
enable suppliers to reach a larger mass of consumers and improve the perceived quality of 
their products). In the model, firms that employ talented workers manage to produce high 
quality goods and gain larger profits; due to the presence of fixed market access costs, only 
high performing firms engage in export. An increase in income inequality is shown to be 
associated with export growth only when globalisation takes place through reduced trade 
barriers.   29 






















We believe that this paper makes three steps further Marin and Verdier 
(2002) because: 1) the role of human capital is captured and its interaction 
with the market environment is clearly spelled; 2) the international context is 
explicitly drawn, by means o f a North-South model à la Krugman and 
Helpman; 3) while Marin and Verdier (2002) conclude that similar countries, 
with different corporate cultures, may eventually converge to the same 
organisational form, but leave such a form indeterminate, this paper also 
predicts the destination of convergence. 
However, the Internalisation issue remains unexplored in its international 
dimension, and only the domestic ownership decision is modelled, by 
finding that a world wide war for talent – which is the key force at play – 
influences firms’ decision between Domestic Integration and Domestic 
Outsourcing. 




In the present paper, we have provided a unitary framework to analyse recent 
contributions on foreign direct investment – a topic that has traditionally 
been studied within International Economics – through new tools derived 
from different theories of the firm. 
These contributions share a common feature in bridging ideas, originally 
developed in Microeconomics, with an international setting of trade and 
FDI, so that the make-or-buy decision of multinational corporations is 
assessed through the opening up of the “black box” and the simultaneous 
endogenization of the market environment. 
Our key, in reading the burgeoning literature on Internalisation has been to 
recognize three Archetypes, based on famous theories of the firm  – 
Grossman-Hart-Moore treatment of hold-up and contractual incompleteness, 
Holmstrom-Milgrom view of the firm as an incentive system, Aghion-Tirole 
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how they have been embedded in equilibrium models to explain the 
boundaries of global enterprises. 
In presenting the papers, within each field, we did not follow a chronological 
order, rather we moved from the simpler specifications where only 
ownership  – Integration versus Outsourcing  - or location  – Home versus 
Foreign country  - decisions were analysed, to richer formalisations that 
accounted for the intersection of the two dimensions, giving rise to the four 
alternatives of Domestic Integration, Domestic Outsourcing, FDI and 
International Outsourcing. 
While Archetype 1 based-approach has fruitfully developed in a number of 
interesting directions, offering a complete characterisation of the interactions 
between ownership and location choices (Section 2), Archetype 3 based-
approach is the least mature, since the domestic ownership decision is the 
only issue that has been treated so far, following Aghion and Tirole (1997) 
theory of formal and real authority (Section 3.2). 
Despite the important achievements that the literature surveyed here has 
reached, we believe that a few tesserae are still missing  in drawing the 
complete picture. 
As far as we know, no attempt has been made in combining the three 
archetypes in a unitary framework to see how hold up concerns may 
eventually interact with incentives problems, and how this richer apparatus 
can be settled in equilibrium models. 
In  Feenstra and Hanson (2004), Archetype 1 and 2 are treated as 
complements, rather than substitutes, but the authors only build a simple 
theory of the firm model, without any attempt at endogenizing the market 
environment. 
Moreover, notice that the whole set of models reviewed in this paper focus 
on vertical FDI – aimed at saving on costs  - while neither the hold up 
mechanism nor the incentive issue has been applied to a situation of 
horizontal FDI – aimed at selling in the local market. 
This, together with the need of empirical tests to complement such a 
theoretical literature, represents one of the main challenge for future work on 
Internalisation. 
Finally, we believe that a future agenda should include also a richer menu of 
contractual arrangements, other than FDI versus  partnering: except for 
Ottaviano and Turrini (2003) no attempt has been made to compare the 
attractiveness of a broader array of alternatives  - including export, 
integration and various forms of Outsourcing – but still their model takes the 
international dimension as given, considering only ownership concerns, and 
ruling out the location dimension. 
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